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Civil Code article 3061 provides for the discharge of the
surety when his subrogation rights have been prejudiced "by
the act of the creditor." In Pioneer Bank & Trust Co. v. Foggin,1
this article is used in connection with some of the discussion
which centers on the loss of subrogation rights due to acts of
the debtor. However, the question of whether the surety is re-
leased in the latter situation did not have to be decided because
the court found that the surety had knowledge of the debtor's
acts which were carried out with the consent of creditor. Fur-
thermore, the court did not find that there had been any im-
pairment of the security by reason of these acts. Since the
surety's principal undertaking is to the creditor, there would be
no basis for his release on account of prejudicial acts of the
debtor performed without the knowledge or consent of the credi-
tor, regardless of whether the surety had any knowledge of the
acts involved.
The quotation in the dissenting opinion, "It is a longstanding
rule in Louisiana that an action by a principal debtor which
releases any security, without the knowledge or consent of an
endorser or surety, relieves the latter, ' 2 is from a case in which
the debtor acted with the consent of the creditor, thus bringing
the situation within the textual scope of article 3061.4 This
would not be so where the debtor's acts were done without the
knowledge and consent of the creditor.
REPAIRMAN'S PRIVILEGE
The repairman's privilege is effective against the thing on
which he has worked regardless of whether his personal claim
for payment is against the owner or some other person." Of
course, the repairman can waive the privilege, and if he does
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 177 So. 2d 131 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965), writs denied, 248 La. 423, 179
So.2d 18 (1965).
2. 177 So. 2d at 136-37.
3. Glass v. MeLendon, 66 So. 2d 369, 370 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953).
4. See also 2 PLANXIOL nos. 2382 et seq.
5. LA. CIVIL Come art. 3217(2) (1870) ; LA. R.S. 9:4501, 4502 (1950).
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so expressly there is no problem. The difficulties arise when his
actions and behavior are urged as the basis of an implied waiver.
In Babineaux v. Grisaffi,6 Duplantis caused the damage to
Grisaffi's automobile and had the car taken to his own garage,
where he arranged to have the repairs made. It was agreed that
he (Duplantis) would make payment by installments. The court
concluded that there was an implied waiver of the privilege be-
cause the repairman agreed to look to Duplantis alone for pay-
ment and that the installment arrangement was "wholly incon-
sistent with the assertion of any lien on the vehicle within 90
days." In making this decision, the court relied upon the earlier
case of Wardlaw Bros. Garage, Inc. v. Thomas,7 where a similar
situation was found.
Privileges are created only -by legislative authority and the
preferential status of such creditors is an exceptional one. 8 To
deprive a person of this special right by an implied waiver should
require conclusive evidence, and actions which are "wholly incon-
sistent" with any reliance upon the protection of this privilege
might well satisfy this test. However, actions which could still
include reliance on the privilege are not "wholly inconsistent."
Accepting the credit of the person who was responsible for the
damage instead of cash payment or the credit of the car owner
is not of itself wholly inconsistent with reliance on the privilege.
For the Civil Code privilege, the creditor can preserve the privi-
lege by retaining possession (with no time limit) ; and for the
repairman's statutory privilege under R.S. 9:4501, the privilege
is good for 90 days after the job is done (even though delivered
to debtor). If the creditor accepts an installment arrangement
which extends beyond the 90-day period, his action is "wholly
inconsistent" with any reliance on the privilege; but if he ex-
tends credit for a period less than 90 days, or if he still retains
possession of the object, there is no reason why he cannot still
make use of his privilege.
In the principal case, the facts do not disclose for how long
a period the repairman agreed to extend credit to Duplantis;
and unless this was for a period in excess of 90 days, there
should not be an implied waiver of the privilege on the score
of looking to Duplantis alone for payment. Furthermore, as a
6. 180 So. 2d 888 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
7. 19 La. App. 241, 140 So. 108 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1932).
8. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3182-3185 (1870).
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separate basis for the preservation of the privilege, there was
also the fact of his retentionO of the automobile (until bonded
by the owner), which is more consistent with an assertion and
reliance on the privilege than with a waiver of it.
BUILDING CONTRACT LAW
The building contract law,1 which creates liens and privi-
leges to secure payment of services and supplies, is in deroga-
tion of common rights and must be strictly construed in favor
of the property owner whose common rights are affected. This
is in accord with the rule of stricti juris in Civil Code article
3185. Accordingly, in Pennington v. Campanella," the court
held that a subcontractor's expense in securing insurance and
the amount of his profit which had been separately stipulated
(in a cost-plus-profit contract) were not covered by the language
of the statute. From the-point of view of the statutory security,
this decision gives the contractor and subcontractor better pro-
tection with a lump sum agreement than with a cost-plus con-
tract.
Similarly, in Mayeux v. Lamco,12 it was held that under the
public works contract law 13 the surety bond does not cover the
claim of an unpaid lessor of manned equipment which had been
rented to the contractor. The lessor of the equipment was not a
subcontractor because he did not have the responsibility to per-
form a specific part of the contract. Neither could a privilege
attach for the salaries of the workmen or the supplies utilized
because there were not separate items but were comprised within
the single claim of rental charges.
MORTGAGES- PUBLIC RECORDS DOCTRINE
In Louisiana, the public records doctrine is often referred
to in sacrosanct terms, but it must be remembered that there
are some exceptional situations in which the law protects certain
interests despite their absence from the public records. One such
situation occurred in the case of Lacour v. Ford Investment
9. Id. art. 3217(2); LA. R.S. 9:4502(A) (1950).
10. LA. R.S. 9:4801 et seq. (1950).
11. 180 So. 2d 882 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965), writ granted, 248 La. 783, 181
So.2d 782 (1966).
12. 180 So. 2d 425 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
13. LA. R.S. 38:2242 (1950).
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Corp.,14 where the court reiterated the well-established rule that
a mortgage continues to have its full effectiveness despite a
cancellation on the basis of a fraudulent release.15 Likewise,
during the interval allowed for inscription, vendors' liens 16 and
building contract privileges 7 are temporarily secret liens not
discoverable in the public records. Incidentally noteworthy in-
cidents of the opinion in the principal case are (1) a footnote
distinction between the civil law attitude concerning stare decisis
in the branches of the law which call for greater certainty and
those in which the nature of the subject calls for greater adapt-
ability,' and (2) the forceful assertion that Civil Code article 21
does not open the door to the admission of equitable principles





Normally, one co-owner cannot prescribe against other co-
owners because his possession is precarious. Even if he occupies
physically the entire property, his status as co-owner incor-
porates recognition of the rights of the others, and therefore he
is not in possession as owner of their shares. However, this does
not completely exclude the possibility of acquisitive prescription
where the physical occupation is under circumstances which are
inconsistent with recognition of other rights and hostile to any
such possible claims.
This is what occurred in Continental Oil Co. v. Arceneaux.1
14. 183 So. 2d 463 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966), writ granted, 249 La. 385, 186
So.2d 630 (1966).
15. Citing Zimmer v. Fryer, 190 La. 814, 183 So. 166 (1938); see also
Gallagher v. Conner, 138 La. 633, 70 So. 539 (1915).
16. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3274 (1870).
17. LA. R.S. 9:4801 et 8eq. (1950).
18. 183 So. 2d at 465, n. 1.
19. Id. at 467 - text supported by note 4.
*Professor of Law. Iouisiana State University.
1. 183 So. 2d 399 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966), writ refused, 249 La. 66, 184 So. 2d
736 (1966).
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